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Abstract 
 
 
 
Innovation processes within corporations increasingly tap into international technology 
sources, yet little is known about the relative contribution of different types of innovation 
channels. We investigate the effectiveness of different types of international technology 
sourcing activities using survey information on German companies complemented with 
information from the European Patent Office. German firms with inventors based in the US 
disproportionately benefit from R&D knowledge located in the US. The positive influence on 
total factor productivity is larger if the research of the inventors results in co-applications of 
patents with US companies. Moreover, research cooperation with American suppliers also 
enables German firms to better tap into US R&D, but cooperation with customers and 
competitors does not appear to aid technology sourcing. The results suggest that the “brain 
drain” to the US can have upsides for corporations tapping into American know-how. 
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1 Introduction 
A number of recent contributions have shown that since the 1980s, R&D and innovation 
processes have become increasingly internationalized. While R&D used to be considered a 
typical headquarter activity in the decades after WWII, most multinational firms nowadays 
utilize several R&D locations in order to tap into the knowledge that is available in particular 
countries and regions1. Policy-makers are still trying to grapple with this development – after 
all, the build-up of R&D capacities abroad may weaken domestic R&D activities, and the 
international connections of multinationals (MNEs) may also lead to other countries profiting 
from any R&D subsidies that domestic firms receive. Hence, it is of considerable importance 
to gauge the implications of the globalization of R&D and innovation. 
Moreover, for the last decade management researchers have shown that commercial 
innovation processes are veering towards an “open innovation” approach whereby innovating 
firms rely increasingly on contributions by external partners, both international and national 
(Chesbrough, 2003). But while the tendency towards more distributed innovation processes 
has been documented in recent studies (e.g. Laursen and Salter, 2006), little systematic 
evidence is available to demonstrate that “open innovation” has had a major impact on firm 
level outcomes. For corporate decision-makers it is also important to measure the impact of 
different forms of opening the innovation processes. Which forms of collaboration and 
technology sourcing provide a particularly strong impact on productivity? 
Our paper addresses this issue which is at the intersection of the economics and management 
of innovation processes. While earlier work has employed patent data, we rely on a unique 
combination of survey-based firm-level information on modes of cooperation and technology 
sourcing with publicly available patent data. 
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Much of the literature on R&D internationalization rests on the notion of R&D externalities. 
Due to the public good property of knowledge, companies can benefit from knowledge 
created by other parties, even if the research is undertaken at distant locations. However, there 
are geographic boundaries to knowledge spillovers.2 Since some parts of knowledge are tacit 
and can best be accessed through face to face interactions, knowledge can be described as 
local public good.  
In order to gain access to tacit knowledge, companies may need a local presence in the 
proximity of and access to the knowledge source. Therefore, it can be useful for companies to 
locate R&D activities abroad. Technology sourcing can be defined as sourcing technological 
knowledge from local knowledge pools. This paper examines whether companies that have 
inventors based in a different country or have R&D cooperations in other countries benefit 
more from the foreign knowledge stock. In this regard it follows a number of other studies. 
Griffith et al. (2006) investigate whether UK firms with inventors based in the USA benefit 
from the knowledge available in this country. The authors find evidence that basing inventors 
abroad is an effective strategy for technology sourcing. Their analysis focuses on companies 
from the UK and employs patent data from the USPTO.  
Papers in this tradition may be criticized on the ground that publicly available data do not 
contain detailed information on firm-level collaboration. The presumed externalities detected 
when using patent data may be caused in part by commercial relationships in which external 
partners simply provide research results and knowledge as an input. In this paper, we 
therefore extend the analysis by investigating the impact of inventor location as well as co-
applications which indicate the presence of formal collaborations. Moreover, we explicitly 
consider different modes of collaboration, such as R&D cooperations with customers, 
suppliers, and competitors. 
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Distinguishing between different forms of technology sourcing allows us to contribute to the 
managerial literature on innovation management and open innovation. So far the mechanisms 
of technology sourcing are not well understood. There are important differences with respect 
to the intensity of exchange with local researchers and corporations. Companies can locate 
researchers abroad or they can have researchers work together with foreign companies 
resulting in co-applications of patents. There are also differences with respect to how 
technologically advanced R&D activities at the location of the collaboration are. For example, 
companies may aim at adapting existing products to new markets, or they may pursue the 
more ambitious objective of developing new technologies at the foreign location. 
To identify the various mechanisms leading to productivity growth, our analysis employs data 
from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). The panel dataset we use covers more than 900 
German companies over the time period from 1992 to 2003. The MIP data contain 
information on whether companies engage in R&D cooperation in foreign countries and 
whether these cooperations involve customers, suppliers, or competitors. Information on 
inventor location is taken from patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). The 
knowledge stock abroad is approximated with business R&D expenditures at the sectoral 
level (OECD’s ANBERD). We focus on R&D activities of German companies in the USA, 
since in many areas the USA is the technologically most advanced country. Moreover, given 
the size of the US economy, the US is also an attractive location for R&D that seeks to adapt 
products to the needs of US customers. 
The information on the intensity of exchange with local researchers is calculated from patent 
data. Since the private address of inventors is given, we know whether German companies 
have inventors in the US. Some German companies apply for patents together with US 
companies (co-patenting), which is an indication of formal collaboration in research and 
development. We infer how technologically advanced the US-based R&D activity is from the 
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type of cooperation partner. Cooperations with customers are often entered into in order to 
adapt existing products to new markets. Cooperations with competitors or suppliers more 
likely have the aim of developing new technologies. We estimate a Cobb-Douglas production 
function augmented with external knowledge stocks. The activities of technology sourcing are 
interacted with the external knowledge stocks. The coefficients of the interaction terms allow 
us to assess the extent to which companies benefit from technology sourcing in the form of 
higher TFP. 
We find evidence that those differences in the type of the R&D activity matter. It is important 
how close contacts are, and closer contacts are better for technology sourcing. Companies 
benefit from having inventors based in the US. However, companies benefit more if they are 
engaged in joint R&D projects with local companies that results in joint patent applications. 
The type of cooperation partner matters as well. We find evidence for a positive influence of 
cooperation with suppliers on TFP. For cooperations with customers and competitors we find 
no influence. 
The findings have implications for economic policy and for managerial decision-making. Our 
results clearly indicate that overall company performance profits from undertaking R&D in 
foreign locations. While this result is not surprising, it should be helpful in answering 
concerns of the policy-making community. Encouraging cooperation with foreign partners 
may even be useful in order to advance domestic productivity. 
The remainder of the paper presents our approach, data and results. Section 2 describes the 
theoretical framework and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the empirical model 
and data. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
5 
2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Our paper seeks to contribute to the literature on technology sourcing and international R&D-
related knowledge flows. Moreover, we shed light on the questions which modes of 
cooperation are particularly productive when firms seek to open their innovation processes for 
contributions of collaborating entities. We draw on these literatures to develop our 
hypotheses. 
There is a large literature on knowledge spillovers. One strand focuses on domestic spillovers 
(see, for example, Harhoff, 2000; Bloom et al., 2010 on spillovers and product market 
rivalry). Another strand focuses on international spillovers. International economics 
investigates knowledge spillovers working through trade and foreign direct investment. 
International spillovers are analyzed by, for example, Coe and Helpman (1995). Keller (2004) 
provides a literature review on international technology diffusion. 
Access to the part of knowledge that is codified is likely to be insensitive to geographical 
distance. No matter where the researcher is located, the information regarding this form of 
knowledge has the same quality. But it is also well established that knowledge flows are 
geographically bounded (e.g. see Griffith et al. for recent evidence). Since some parts of 
knowledge are tacit and can best be accessed through face to face interactions, knowledge can 
be described as local public good. In order to gain access to tacit knowledge, companies need 
a local presence in the proximity of and access to the knowledge source.  
Since it is often not possible or not efficient to create all knowledge necessary for the 
development of a specific product inside the company, it has become increasingly important 
for firms to tap into knowledge that is available outside the own boundaries. Due to the 
“tacitness” of some part of knowledge, companies need to interact with other researchers that 
are outside the own country. The ascendancy of “open innovation” processes has made it all 
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the more important for firms to seek out and utilize external providers of innovation-related 
information. 
FDI is an important channel for overcoming the geographic boundedness of knowledge 
spillovers. Branstetter (2006) shows that Japanese multinationals undertaking direct 
investments in the USA enjoy productivity advantages in comparison to firms without this 
FDI activity.3 In a similar vein, Iwasa and Odagiri (2004) look at knowledge sourcing by 
Japanese companies in the US. Research-oriented subsidiaries of Japanese firms in the US 
benefit from locally available knowledge. 
Firms may also engage in formal collaboration with particular partners who possess specific 
forms of knowledge. The knowledge flows in such collaborations need to be distinguished 
from externalities, since they are likely to be governed by a commercial quid pro quo. The 
collaborating partners will engage in a contractual relationship, and information flows are 
likely to be accompanied by payments made by the net receiver of knowledge. We build in 
particular on an earlier contribution by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) who point out that the 
mechanisms of technology sourcing have not been the subject of detailed scientific studies. 
While they focus on a limited set of sourcing modes, we investigate several mechanisms, such 
as formal cooperation with customers, suppliers and competitors.  
We look at mechanisms for technology sourcing that can be achieved with existing 
employees. Complementary research looks at the hiring of experienced researchers from 
competitors as a further strategy of knowledge acquisition (see, for example, Almeida and 
Kogut, 1999 and Singh and Agrawal, 2011). 
In this paper we want to shed light on the question of how successful different types of R&D 
activity abroad are for technology sourcing. One main strategy is to locate own researchers 
abroad. In this way the researchers are closer to the knowledge of other countries. The 
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intensity of interaction with local researchers can differ. It is possible that researchers mainly 
work alone but have informal contacts to other researchers, or alternatively, it is possible that 
researchers work together with other companies on joint research projects. In this paper we 
will look at both forms of R&D activity abroad. Cockburn and Henderson (1998) show that 
the research productivity of pharmaceutical firms is higher if the firms have a higher share of 
their publications coauthored with universities. The process of preparing joint publications 
requires close collaboration and leads to an exchange of tacit knowledge. 
Other studies have shown that research collaborations as documented by co-inventions 
support the transmission of knowledge (Breschi and Lissoni, 2006; Jaffe et al., 2000 and 
Singh, 2005). Such individual-level collaborations may be initiated within formal R&D 
cooperations. Companies have the possibility to cooperate with different partners abroad. The 
most common partners are customers, suppliers and competitors. Independent of where the 
cooperation partner is located, companies benefit from R&D cooperations through cost and 
risk sharing, by avoiding duplication of effort, cross-fertilization of ideas, shortening 
development times, and access to specific knowledge of the partner (Hagedoorn, 1993). A 
large literature has analyzed the determinants of R&D cooperations (see, for example, 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Hernan et al., 2003; Röller et al., 2007; Sakakibara, 1997; 
Belderbos et al., 2004a; and Kaiser, 2002). Astonishingly little is known about the impact of 
R&D cooperations on firm-level productivity (see, for example, Belderbos et al., 2004b). 
In this paper we investigate whether collaboration with particular types of cooperation 
partners are a means of successful technology sourcing. Different cooperation partners 
typically imply differences in the type of joint activities. First, collaborations with customers 
often have the aim of adapting existing products to new markets. The development of new 
technologies is not at the forefront of interests. Companies have the opportunity to learn about 
the demand and the preferences of customers and to adapt products to local tastes (von 
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Hippel, 1988). Second, companies can get access to upstream technological developments in 
cooperations with suppliers. Typically, the R&D activity involved in this form of cooperation 
would be technologically more advanced than in cooperations with customers. Cooperations 
with suppliers are, for example, very important in the German automotive industry (Felli et 
al., 2011). Third, companies can cooperate at pre-competitive stages of technology 
development with competitors. Cooperations with competitors can be beneficial, because 
competitors often face the same problems. Furthermore, companies can learn about the 
strengths and weaknesses of competitors in cooperations. These cooperations give the 
opportunity to develop common standards, to influence the regulatory environment and to 
share development costs (Röller et al., 2007). 
3 Empirical model and Data 
3.1 Empirical Specification 
We estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function which is augmented with external 
knowledge stocks (Griliches, 1992 and Griffith et al., 2006).  
 
ln salesit = β1 ln employmentit + β2 ln materialsit + β3 ln capitalit  
+ β4 ln firm R&Dit + β5 dummy zero firm R&Dit 
+ β6 ln US industry R&Djt + β7 ln GER industry R&Djt 
+ β8 wiUS * ln US industry R&Djt + β9 wiGER * ln GER industry R&Djt 
+ β10 ln US industry value addedjt + β11 ln GER industry value addedjt + μi + εit  
 
Where R&Dit is the stock of R&D in company i at time t and subscript j indicates industry-
specific information. wiUS is the company-specific spillover weight which indicates the type of 
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R&D activity that is performed in the US and wiGER is the equivalent measure for Germany 
(see below for exact definitions). In the case of the patent-related variables, the intensity of 
the activity is reflected as well. A “US” pre-fix denotes US based activities and a “GER” 
prefix denotes German based activities. 
The coefficient of main interest is β8. It is the coefficient on the interaction term between the 
US knowledge stock and the “exposure” of the German company to this knowledge. A 
positive and significant coefficient would indicate that German companies successfully source 
knowledge in the USA. Note that the weights wiCOUNTRY are time invariant and thus absorbed 
by the firm fixed effect. The identification of β8 comes from the differential impact of (time-
varying) industry R&D on the (time-invariant) exposure of the firm to US (or German) ideas 
as proxied by the type of R&D activity conducted in the US (or Germany). It is analogous to a 
difference in differences method where the first difference is the change in industry by 
country R&D and the other difference is across firms (within an industry) which employ more 
or fewer inventors located in a particular nation. 
An industry-level measure of value added is included to control for industry-level shocks that 
may be correlated with R&D activity. Company fixed effects (μi) and year dummies are 
included in all specifications. Because the company-specific spillover weight is time-
invariant, its basis term is eliminated by the fixed-effects approach.  
The term εit is a stochastic error term. Since this may be correlated with contemporaneous 
values of the factor inputs we also present GMM models where we allow for endogeneity and 
instrument the first differenced version of the production function with lags of variables dated 
t-2 and before (Arellano and Bond, 1991). We also considered the additional moments in 
Blundell and Bond (1998), but found that these were generally rejected by specification tests. 
In any case we did not find a large downward bias on the capital coefficient often found in 
production function estimates. 
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The weights we use are time invariant and the patent-based weights are averaged over the 
long time period of 1978 to 2003. Since the post 1993 data may be contaminated by 
endogeneity we consider robustness tests using only pre-sample 1993 values of the patent-
based weights to assess the magnitude of any suspected bias. Unfortunately, the time-
dimension in our data is not long enough to allow us the use of pre-sample information for the 
cooperation partners. 
We consider a GMM approach following Blundell and Bond (2000) rather than a control 
function approach to estimate the firm-level production functions. Including another 
endogenous state variable (which affected the evolution of productivity) into a control 
function framework such as the one of Olley and Pakes (1997) is non-trivial (see the 
discussion in Ackerberg et al. (2007) for example). This is because the dynamic structural 
model underlying the approach has to be re-solved. The approach developed by Doraszelski 
and Jamandreu (2008) is a one attempt but does rely on some rather strong assumptions about 
competition in the factor input markets. The attraction of the GMM approach is that all factor 
inputs chosen at the firm-level are treated in the same way as endogenous variables. 
3.2 Data Sources 
3.2.1 Survey data 
Our analysis is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), an annual survey providing 
information about German companies with at least five employees. The survey includes 
detailed information about R&D activities as well as basic company characteristics. The 
survey methodology largely follows the guidelines of the OECD/Eurostat Oslo-Manual on 
innovation statistics. The MIP is a voluntary mail survey with a response rate of between 20 
and 25 percent. The first wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) was carried out in 
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1993. Every fourth year the survey is the German part of the European wide Community 
Innovation Surveys (CIS) coordinated by Eurostat (1993, 1997 and 2001). 
The target population of the MIP covers legally independent German firms. Since there is no 
business register in Germany, a private information source is used for the sampling frame. 
The sampling frame is the database of Germany’s most important credit rating agency 
‘Creditreform’ from which a stratified random sample is drawn. Stratification is done 
according to eight size classes, industry (mostly according to 2-digit NACE classes) and 
region (East and West Germany). A sample refreshment takes place every second year. 
The MIP covers companies from the manufacturing and the service sector, but we limit our 
analysis to companies from manufacturing, as industry-level data on R&D expenditures in 
services are very limited. We use an unbalanced panel covering the years 1992 to 2003. Only 
companies with at least five consecutive observations are included. Companies belonging to a 
non-European group (e.g. head-quartered in the US or in Japan) are excluded. The analysis is 
based on 6447 observations of 910 companies.  
3.2.2 Patent data 
The information from the MIP is combined with patent information from the European Patent 
Office (EPO). Information on all patent applications since 1978 is available. For companies 
belonging to a group the ultimate owner has been identified. Patent information for the 
ultimate owner and all its subsidiaries is used for companies belonging to a group. The 
inventor location is identified from patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). 
Information on applications is taken from ESPACE Bulletin, a data base published by the 
EPO, which contains full information on patent applications for the years 1978 to 2003. The 
patent data is matched to the company data through a comparison of name and address 
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information of companies and applicants. Matches are suggested by a text search algorithm 
and then manually checked.  
The information on patents applied for by groups is taken from the CEP/IFS merge of EPO 
patents with European companies (Abramovsky et al., 2008). Information on the ownership 
structure of companies from the Amadeus data base was used to determine the ultimate owner 
for companies belonging to a group. Ownership shares of 50 percent or more are followed 
upwards until the ultimate owner is found. All European subsidiaries covered in Amadeus and 
belonging to the ultimate owner are included in the group structure. The patent holdings of the 
ultimate owner and all European subsidiaries are used for sample companies belonging to a 
group. The ownership information from the year 2005 is the basis for the construction of the 
ultimate owner. 
3.2.3 Industry-level data 
The company level data is completed with industry information from the OECD for Germany 
and the USA. Industry-level R&D information is taken from the OECD source ANBERD. It 
contains business R&D expenditure at the two-digit SIC level. The analysis is limited to the 
manufacturing sector and to the years 1992-2003 due to restrictions in this data source. The 
OECD STAN database is used to obtain information on industry specific value added as a 
volume index at the two-digit SIC level. 
Our analysis focuses on R&D activities of German firms in the USA. We chose the USA, 
since this country plays a leading role in many high-tech sectors. Since US companies are 
often at the forefront of technological developments, they are attractive partners for 
technology sourcing. The attractiveness of North American research partners has increased 
over time. The share of research partnerships between Europe and North America in all 
research partnerships has increased from 16.2% in the 1960’s to 25.2% in the 1990’s 
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(Hagedoorn, 2002). This is an indication that the costs of such partnerships have fallen or that 
the rewards have increased. 
3.3 Computation of Variables 
The input variables turnover, material costs, capital stock and R&D stock are deflated to 1995 
prices.4 Labor input is measured as number of employees in full-time equivalents. The capital 
stock of the company is calculated using the perpetual inventory method. Tangible assets are 
taken as starting value for the capital stock, we use depreciation rate of 15%.5 The perpetual 
inventory method is also used to calculate the R&D stocks at company and industry level 
(using ANBERD) from R&D expenditures with the same assumptions on depreciation and 
steady state growth as other capital.  
Information on inventor location in EPO patent applications is used to identify whether 
companies have inventors based in the USA. We calculate the share of patents with at least 
one inventor based in the USA as an indicator of the importance of technology sourcing 
activity (% Inventors). The calculation of the time-invariant weights is based on the full 
patent application stock of the firms during the time-period from 1978 to 2003. An analogous 
variable is calculated for inventors based in Germany. The EPO does not indicate a lead 
inventor in patent applications, therefore all inventors are considered. We also calculate the 
share of patent applications with a US company as Co-applicant and an analogous variable for 
Co-applications with other German companies (% Co-applicants). Co-applications with 
companies in the USA or in Germany belonging to the same group as the MIP company are 
disregarded for the calculation of this measure. We use the patent stock of the companies in 
the year 2003 as basis for the calculation of the patent-related variables. The patent related 
variables are set to zero for companies without patent applications6.  
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Information on cooperations is taken from the MIP. R&D cooperation is defined in the survey 
as active participation in joint R&D projects with other companies or not-for-profit 
organizations. Mere contract research without active collaboration is not counted as 
cooperation. The time-invariant dummy variable for R&D cooperation is set equal to one if 
the company indicated in at least one MIP survey that it engaged in R&D cooperation with a 
company in the USA or Germany respectively. Information on cooperation was collected in 
the years 1993, 1997 and 2001 and covers the time periods 1992, 1994-1996, and 1998-2000. 
The survey questions referred to R&D cooperation in the year 1993 and to innovation 
cooperation in the remaining years. 
It is possible to differentiate different forms of cooperation according to partner. We look 
separately at cooperation with customers, suppliers, and competitors. Information on the type 
of cooperation partner as well as on the country where the cooperation partner resides is 
extracted from the MIP data.7 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the productivity variables. Our sample contains 
mainly medium-sized companies. The average number of employees is 430, with a median 
value of 94. 36% of companies do not conduct formal R&D and 28% of the company-year 
observations have at least one patent application. 
In Table 2 we show descriptive statistics for the spillover weights. 99.6 percent of German 
companies with at least one patent application have at least one inventor based in Germany 
and 19.9 percent of those companies have at least one inventor based in the USA. Co-
applications between German and US companies are less frequent. 43.2 percent of German 
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companies with patent applications have at least one application together with another 
German company. The respective figure for co-applications with US-based companies is 3.6 
percent.8 24.5 percent of German companies engage in research cooperations with a German 
partner. For US partners the respective figure is 4.8 percent. The most important cooperation 
partner both within Germany and based in the US is customers. 
Table 3 contains correlations for the spillover weights. There is a positive correlation between 
having inventors based in the USA and having a cooperation partner in the USA, but it is not 
significant for the cooperation partners customer and supplier. This indicates that companies 
choose different channels for technology sourcing. The correlation between basing inventors 
abroad and cooperating abroad is lower than the correlations between the different 
cooperation types. The correlation between having inventors in Germany and having 
cooperation partners in Germany is higher than the respective US correlation, but the 
correlations between different cooperation partners are similar for the US and for Germany. 
The correlation of spillover weights for two activities in the same country tend to be higher 
than the corresponding correlation for one activity taking place between countries (e.g. in the 
US and in Germany). 
4.2 Main Results 
In Table 4 we present our regression results. The dependent variable is the log of sales. 
Column 1 shows the estimate of the basic production function. The estimates indicate 
constant returns to scale as the sum of the coefficients on the factor inputs (labor, material, 
capital and R&D) are very close to unity. The fixed-effects results for the production function 
are shown in column 2. The most prominent changes compared to OLS are a higher 
coefficient for labour input and a smaller coefficient for materials.  
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In column 3 we include industry level controls for R&D and value added in the US and 
Germany and the interaction term of industry-level R&D stock and share of inventors in the 
respective country. The coefficient on the interaction between US R&D and the proportion of 
a firm’s inventors in the US is positive and highly significant. This is a key result – it is 
apparent that locating inventors in the USA helps to benefit from the knowledge available, 
just as the technology sourcing argument would claim. This result is consistent with the 
finding of Griffith et al. (2006) on UK data. The insignificance of the respective interaction 
term for Germany should not be interpreted as evidence that there are no knowledge 
spillovers within Germany. Companies based in Germany have by definition a local presence. 
There is no need for them to rely explicitly on local inventors in order to benefit from the 
local knowledge.9  
Looking at the other results in column 3 it is clear that the industry-level value added in 
Germany has a positive correlation with productivity, which can be a reflection of higher 
capacity utilization due to positive demand shocks. The linear industry-level R&D stocks of 
Germany and the US have no direct influence on productivity.  
In order to judge the economic significance of our results we calculate by how much German 
companies benefited from basing inventors in the USA. During the sample period of 1992-
2003 the industry-level R&D stock in the USA increased by 21.4 percent. This increase is 
associated with a 14.7 percent increase in TFP for a German company with the average share 
of inventors based in the USA.10 For comparison, Griffith et al. (2006) find a 5 percent 
increase in TFP for UK firms from basing inventors in the USA. The larger gain for the 
sample of German companies may be explained by differences in the sample composition. In 
the German sample we have many medium sized companies, whereas the UK sample is based 
on publicly listed firms. For the medium sized companies it is presumably a higher hurdle to 
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base inventors in the US, so it makes sense that they would require higher benefits from this 
investment. 
In Table 5 we investigate the effectiveness of different types of technology sourcing. We find 
that more intense collaboration resulting in patent co-applications has an additional beneficial 
influence on TFP (column 1). A higher intensity of interactions lets companies benefit more 
from local knowledge. 
Columns 2-6 of Table 5 consider the interaction with different partners in R&D cooperations. 
Looking at all partners together, we do not find a significant influence (column 2). When 
looking separately at the different types of partner we do uncover some interesting 
heterogeneity. Cooperation with customers (column 3) does not increase technology sourcing. 
Cooperation with customers are often agreed upon in order to adapt existing products to new 
markets so the R&D stock of the host country may not be so important for this activity. It is 
more important to know what customers want and the required changes can possibly be 
implemented with the R&D that the German company has already undertaken at home. 
By contrast we find that cooperation with suppliers increase technology sourcing from the US 
(column 4). This form of open innovation is beneficial because it allows developing more 
specialized inputs for the production process, which have a very good fit for the buying firm. 
Cooperation with competitors also increases productivity through technology sourcing from 
both the US and Germany (column 5). Firms get access to relevant knowledge and realize 
cost reductions through the avoidance of duplication of research. Note that the magnitude of 
the interaction term with inventor location remains largely stable when additional controls for 
cooperation are included. This suggests that both activities make independent contributions to 
knowledge sourcing. 
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In column 6 we include all technology sourcing mechanisms simultaneously. Filing co-
applications and cooperating with suppliers are the most important interactions as they remain 
statistically significant. The interaction terms for cooperation with both US and German 
suppliers are significant. One reason for this may be that US suppliers could be closer to the 
technology frontier than German suppliers and so have a bigger impact on TFP. The results of 
Table 5 are more speculative than Table 4 because is it not possible to base the weights for 
cooperations on pre-sample information. 11 
We also investigate the relative importance of the sourcing variables in an ‘R-squared’ sense. 
Dropping the co-application variables reduces ‘R-squared within’ by 0.002. Dropping the 
supplier variables has only two thirds of the effect and dropping the customer or competitor 
variables hardly changes R-squared. We therefore conclude that co-applications and 
cooperation with suppliers are the most important mechanisms for international technology 
sourcing. 
4.3 Some Robustness Checks 
Table 6 includes a number of robustness checks. First, we were concerned with the possible 
endogeneity of the weights as they use information within the estimating period (1992-2003) 
even though they are time invariant. Consequently, for the calculation of the share of 
inventors based in the USA and in Germany we use pre-sample patent information, i.e. we 
only use the information from patent applications that have been filed before the first year in 
which the company enters our sample. Column 1 shows that our results are robust to this 
experiment. 
In columns 2-4 of Table 6 we estimate the model on sub-samples of industries. We divide 
these into high, medium and low R&D to sales sectors. Following Grupp and Legler (2000) 
high R&D intensity sectors had more than 7% R&D to sales ratios, low R&D industries had 
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under 2.5% of sales in R&D and medium sectors were the residual. Basing inventors in the 
US is an effective form of technology sourcing for companies in industries with high and 
medium R&D intensity (columns 2 and 3), but not for the low sectors (column 4). In columns 
5 to 6 we restrict the sample to companies with at least one patent application. The results on 
the positive influence on TFP of basing inventors in the US or filing patent applications 
together with US-based companies are confirmed. 
Table 7 contains further robustness checks for our baseline specification from column 6 of 
Table 5. In column 1 we include an additional interaction of industry R&D stocks with the 
size of the patent stock of the firms to control for a levels effect that comes through the 
number of patents. As the additional interactions are insignificant and the main interactions 
remain significant, we can conclude that our results do not simply reflect size related 
advantages in technology sourcing. In column 2 we include an additional interaction of 
industry R&D stocks with firm R&D as R&D might help firms absorb knowledge spillovers 
(the “second face” of R&D as in Griffith et al., 2004). Again we find that the additional 
interactions are insignificant. In our baseline results, the share of inventors based in the US is 
set to zero for firms without inventors in the US and for firms without any patents at all. To 
exclude the possibility that this modeling choice induces distortions we include in column 3 
an interaction of industry R&D stocks with a dummy for no patents. As before, the additional 
interaction terms are insignificant, and our main results do not change. Lastly, column 4 
contains a specification with industry-year fixed effects. Even though this is a demanding 
specification as it absorbs all the industry R&D terms, the US interaction terms remain 
significant. 
Table A1 in the appendix includes robustness checks based on GMM estimators. Estimating 
the production function with GMM allows us to take the possible endogeneity of the input 
factors into account. The fixed effects results of column 3 from Table 4 are confirmed by the 
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GMM estimates of Table A1. This table presents several variants of the GMM estimator 
which show the robustness of our results.12 
 
We have tried to keep the analysis as comparable as possible to Griffith et al. (2006) to aid 
comparison. What are the main differences between this paper and their earlier UK-US 
comparison? First, Griffith et al. (2006) used value added as an output whereas we use output 
and control for materials on the right hand side. This is because materials data is not 
consistently available for the firm-level UK data from Datastream that Griffith et al. (2006) 
used whereas it is available in our German data. Our output-based production function is 
more general than that in Griffith et al. (2006) and so so nests their specification. Second, 
Griffith et al. (2006) use USPTO data whereas we use EPO application data. German firms 
are much more likely to patent at the EPO than USPTO so it seems a more appropriate source 
to use to construct the weights. Moreover, EPO data does not have a lead inventor (so we use 
all inventors). Finally, we use all applicants, rather than just those which were subsequently 
granted which is what Griffith et al. (2006) use. This is because non-granted applicant data 
was unavailable from the USPTO prior to 2001. Third, Griffith et al. (2006) uses pre-sample 
information to construct the weights whereas we use all patent information (including in-
sample information) to construct the weights. This is because USPTO data is available back 
to 1965 whereas the EPO data only goes back to 1978 when the EPO was founded. 
Furthermore, German firms made full use of the possibility to patent at the EPO only towards 
the end of the 1980s, which further restricts the informational content of the early years. 
Nevertheless as column 1 of Table 6 shows, the results are robust to just using pre-sample 
weights. Finally, the preferred results in Griffith et al. (2006) are on System GMM. We found 
that the additional “Blundell-Bond” moment restrictions were rejected in the German data and 
therefore present the Arellano-Bond results in Table A1. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper investigates technology sourcing activities of German companies in the USA. We 
find that being closer to the knowledge source has a positive influence on the TFP of the 
companies. German companies with inventors in the USA benefit from the US knowledge 
stock. We also find that differences in the type of R&D activity matter. It is important how 
close contacts are and closer contacts are better for technology sourcing. We find that co-
patenting has an additional effect compared to simply locating inventors abroad. The type of 
cooperation partner matters as well. Companies cooperating with suppliers benefit from the 
local knowledge stock whereas cooperations with customers and competitors do not leave 
notable traces in our productivity measures.  
For managers it is important to consider which type of R&D activity they conduct abroad. By 
basing inventors abroad the firms can profit from localized spillovers to which they would 
otherwise not have access. Our results also suggest that performing “open innovation” by 
cooperating with suppliers allows the firm to improve operations. Our results do not imply 
that cooperation with customers and competitors is not beneficial for firms. One should keep 
in mind that we only measure effects on the productivity of the firm in the home country. 
Cooperation with customers can be a boost to selling the products abroad, even if it does not 
increase the productivity at home. Influencing standards and the regulatory environment can 
be beneficial for the long-term development of the firm, even if it does not have a direct 
influence on productivity. 
We conclude that it can be positive for the own country, if companies send researchers 
abroad, since it makes the own companies more productive. The potential loss of highly 
qualified jobs should not be the only consideration when R&D activities are internationalized. 
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A specific form of brain drain can be good. It may be especially worthwhile to encourage 
cooperation with foreign partners for advanced R&D activities. 
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TABLE 1 – 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – PRODUCTIVITY VARIABLES 
 
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max 
Sales 79.7 8.67 718 0.066 21,838 
Employment 430 94 2,679 1 66,781 
Materials 44.6 3.49 504 0.005 17,814 
Capital 27.6 3.20 254 0.011 8,631 
Firm R&D 14.6 0.236 173 0 5,405 
Dummy zero firm R&D 0.360 0 0.480 0 1 
Dummy Eastern Germany 0.325 0 0.468 0 1 
R&D intensity (in %) 1.57 0.074 3.14 0 37.5 
 
Note: Variables measured in million Euro, deflated to 1995 prices. 
 
 
TABLE 2 – 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – SPILLOVER WEIGHTS 
 
 Interaction with the US Interaction within GER 
Variable Mean Obs. > 0 Mean Obs. > 0 
Dummy Inventor 0.199 386 0.996 1933 
Dummy Co-application 0.036 69 0.432 250 
Cooperation any partner 0.048 309 0.245 1578 
Cooperation customer 0.041 262 0.166 1069 
Cooperation supplier 0.014 93 0.152 978 
Cooperation competitor 0.013 87 0.084 541 
 
Note: Dummy Inventor and Dummy Co-application for companies with at least one patent application. 
Dummy Inventor is equal to one if the company has at least one inventor in the respective country. 
Dummy Co-application is equal to one if the company has at least one Co-application with a company 
outside the own group in the respective country. 
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TABLE 3 – 
CORRELATIONS SPILLOVER WEIGHTS 
 
 % Inv.  in US 
% Coapp. 
in US 
Coop. US 
customer 
Coop. US 
supplier 
Coop. US 
comp. 
% Inv.  
in GER 
% Coapp. 
in GER 
Coop. 
GER 
customer 
Coop. 
GER 
supplier 
Coop. 
GER 
comp. 
% Inventors in US 1          
% Co-applications in US 0.220* 1         
Coop. US customer 0.019 0.008 1        
Coop. US supplier 0.019 0.001 0.364* 1       
Coop. US competitor 0.255* -0.007 0.480* 0.347* 1      
% Inventors in GER 0.125* 0.094* 0.265* 0.142* 0.156* 1     
% Co-applications in GER 0.010 -0.0001 0.119* 0.116* 0.034* 0.185* 1    
Coop. GER customer 0.043* 0.048* 0.392* 0.247* 0.212* 0.273* 0.114* 1   
Coop. GER supplier 0.029* 0.053* 0.272* 0.174* 0.119* 0.216* 0.071* 0.517* 1  
Coop. GER competitor 0.125* 0.156* 0.230* 0.128* 0.256* 0.184* 0.036* 0.355* 0.290* 1 
 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 4 – 
R&D AUGMENTED PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS FE FE 
Dependent variable Ln(Sales)   
    
% Inventors  in US*   0.690** 
ln(US industry R&D)   (0.343) 
% Inventors  in GER*   -0.015 
ln(GER industry R&D)   (0.019) 
Ln(employment) 0.400*** 0.515*** 0.514*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) 
Ln(materials) 0.494*** 0.272*** 0.271*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) 
Ln(capital) 0.094*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(firm R&D) 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(US industry R&D)   -0.015 
   (0.018) 
Ln(GER industry R&D)   -0.001 
   (0.018) 
Ln(US industry value added)   0.005 
   (0.020) 
Ln(GER industry value added)   0.113** 
   (0.047) 
    
Observations 6447 6447 6447 
R-squared / R-squared within 0.98 0.62 0.62 
Number of firms 910 910 910 
 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. All regressions contain year dummies and a dummy if R&D is zero. 
Column (1) includes a dummy for East Germany and two digit industry by year interactions. 
31 
TABLE 5 – 
R&D AUGMENTED PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS – TYPE OF INTERACTION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Ln(sales) 
  
% Inventors  in US* 0.492** 0.585 0.625* 0.607* 0.674** 0.508**
ln(US industry R&D) (0.233) (0.367) (0.365) (0.345) (0.343) (0.263)
% Inventors  in GER* -0.015 -0.027 -0.022 -0.032 -0.023 -0.028
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
% Coapp.  in US* 11.02* 10.92**
ln(US industry R&D) (5.70) (5.66)
% Coapp.  in GER* 0.005 0.005
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.005) (0.005)
Cooperation US any*  0.027  
ln(US industry R&D)  (0.051)  
Cooperation GER any*   0.026  
ln(GER industry R&D)  (0.021)  
Cooperation US customer*  0.016 -0.050
ln(US industry R&D)  (0.049) (0.050)
Cooperation GER customer*   0.021 -0.018
ln(GER industry R&D)  (0.023) (0.033)
Cooperation US supplier*  0.228** 0.270**
ln(US industry R&D)  (0.103) (0.110)
Cooperation GER supplier*   0.038* 0.056**
ln(GER industry R&D)  (0.020) (0.028)
Cooperation US comp.*  0.104** 0.023
ln(US industry R&D)  (0.051) (0.066)
Cooperation GER comp.*  -0.003 -0.018
ln(GER industry R&D)  (0.040) (0.042)
Ln(employment) 0.516*** 0.515*** 0.514*** 0.513*** 0.513*** 0.515***
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Ln(materials) 0.269*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.268***
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Ln(capital) 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079***
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Ln(firm R&D) 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026***
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ln(US industry R&D) -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.019 -0.017 -0.019
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Ln(GER industry R&D) 0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.0004 -0.005
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Ln(US industry value added) 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.005
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Ln(GER industry value added) 0.113** 0.111** 0.112** 0.113** 0.114** 0.115**
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
   
Observations 6447 6447 6447 6447 6447 6447
R-squared within 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Number of firms 910 910 910 910 910 910 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. All regressions contain year dummies, fixed effects and a dummy if R&D 
is zero. The dependent variable is ln(sales). Estimation is by within groups including a dummy 
variable for each firm. 
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TABLE 6 – ROBUSTNESS 
 
Experiment  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
 
Pre 
sample 
weights 
High 
R&D 
industries
Medium 
R&D 
industries 
Low 
R&D 
industries 
Firms with 
at least one 
patent 
Firms with 
at least one 
patent 
       
% Inventors pre sample  in US* 0.669**      
ln(US industry R&D) (0.327)      
% Inventors pre sample  in GER* -0.045**      
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.021)      
% Inventors  in US*  0.736*** 3.009** -0.089 0.807* 0.572** 
ln(US industry R&D)  (0.165) (1.233) (0.419) (0.414) (0.250) 
% Inventors  in GER*  -0.060 0.018 0.007 0.020 0.0001 
ln(GER industry R&D)  (0.076) (0.081) (0.035) (0.045) (0.038) 
% Coapp.  in US*      9.713* 
ln(US industry R&D)      (5.275) 
% Coapp.  in GER*      0.002 
ln(GER industry R&D)      (0.004) 
Ln(employment) 0.514*** 0.530*** 0.463*** 0.529*** 0.561*** 0.568*** 
 (0.022) (0.073) (0.039) (0.027) (0.041) (0.040) 
Ln(materials) 0.272*** 0.255*** 0.334*** 0.254*** 0.324*** 0.318*** 
 (0.018) (0.040) (0.035) (0.021) (0.039) (0.039) 
Ln(capital) 0.078*** 0.126*** 0.065** 0.072*** 0.059** 0.059** 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026) 
Ln(firm R&D) 0.026*** 0.002 0.025 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.034** 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.018) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(US industry R&D) -0.013 -0.351***-0.052 0.012 -0.0005 -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.101) (0.057) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Ln(GER industry R&D) 0.004 0.021 0.011 -0.015 -0.055 -0.030 
 (0.018) (0.060) (0.062) (0.021) (0.053) (0.044) 
Ln(US industry value added) 0.004 0.106 -0.032 -0.007 0.014 0.023 
 (0.020) (0.078) (0.035) (0.045) (0.029) (0.028) 
Ln(GER industry value added) 0.118** 0.051 0.139 0.106* -0.038 -0.031 
 (0.047) (0.093) (0.141) (0.060) (0.067) (0.066) 
       
Observations 6447 562 1531 4354 1941 1941 
R-squared within 0.62 0.73 0.63 0.60 0.71 0.71 
Number of firms 910 83 247 631 287 287 
 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Standard errors clustered by firm. All regressions contain fixed effects, year dummies and a dummy if 
R&D is zero. The dependent variable is ln(sales). 
33 
TABLE 7 –  
ROBUSTNESS – ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Ln(sales)  
% Inventors  in US* 0.426* 0.543** 0.586** 0.748***
ln(US industry R&D) (0.252) (0.256) (0.267) (0.249) 
% Inventors  in GER* -0.031 -0.027 -0.003 -0.016 
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.023) (0.021) (0.042) (0.025) 
% Coapp.  in US* 10.149* 10.983* 10.745* 11.234* 
ln(US industry R&D) (5.447) (5.664) (5.645) (5.940) 
% Coapp.  in GER* -0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Cooperation US customer* -0.049 -0.042 -0.054 -0.032 
ln(US industry R&D) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.055) 
Cooperation GER customer*  -0.010 -0.017 -0.018 -0.002 
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) 
Cooperation US supplier* 0.269** 0.280** 0.268** 0.360*** 
ln(US industry R&D) (0.112) (0.109) (0.111) (0.112) 
Cooperation GER supplier*  0.050* 0.061** 0.055** 0.099*** 
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) 
Cooperation US comp.* 0.016 0.016 0.024 -0.023 
ln(US industry R&D) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.075) 
Cooperation GER comp.* -0.020 -0.022 -0.018 -0.068 
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.052) 
ln(firm patent stock) * 0.001  
ln(US industry R&D) (0.002)  
ln(firm patent stock) * -0.000  
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.002)  
Ln(firm R&D) *  -0.002  
ln(US industry R&D)  (0.002)  
Ln(firm R&D) *  0.000  
ln(GER industry R&D)  (0.001)  
Dummy no patents*  -0.007  
ln(US industry R&D)  (0.037)  
Dummy no patents*  0.030  
ln(GER industry R&D)  (0.052)  
Ln(employment) 0.514*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.511*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Ln(materials) 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.267*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Ln(capital) 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.071*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ln(firm R&D) 0.024*** 0.041*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(US industry R&D) -0.011 -0.027 -0.020  
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)  
Ln(GER industry R&D) -0.007 -0.004 -0.003  
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.021)  
Ln(US industry value added) 0.003 0.006 0.004  
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)  
Ln(GER industry value added) 0.110** 0.123*** 0.115**  
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)  
Observations 6,447 6,447 6,447 6,447 
R-squared within 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.647 
Number of firms 910 910 910 910 
 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. All regressions contain year dummies, fixed effects and a dummy if R&D is zero. Column 4 
contains industry-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is ln(sales). 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
TABLE A1 – 
ARELLANO-BOND GMM SPECIFICATIONS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Ln(sales) 
Specification 
 
 
Baseline Use t-3 
moments 
Treat R&D 
as strictly 
exogenous 
Static Add sales 
as an IV 
      
% Inventors  in US* 0.847*** 0.882*** 0.709*** 0.471** 1.175** 
ln(US industry R&D) (0.283) (0.310) (0.269) (0.213) (0.572) 
% Inventors  in GER* -0.040 -0.038 -0.043 -0.019 -0.047 
ln(GER industry R&D) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.042) 
Ln(US industry R&D) -0.025 -0.025 -0.023 -0.005 -0.039 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) 
Ln(GER industry R&D) -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.022 0.0004 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
Ln(US industry value added) 0.031 0.027 0.035 0.038 -0.040 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) 
Ln(GER industry value added) 0.062 0.082 0.073 0.058 0.028 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.072) (0.057) (0.078) 
      
Observations 4627 4627 4627 5537 4627 
 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Standard errors clustered by firm.  All regressions are based on the specification in column (5) of table 
4. We include current and lagged values of firm sales, capital, labour, materials, firm R&D, a dummy 
if R&D is zero or missing and year dummies. The dependent variable is ln sales. We use the Arellano-
Bond (1991) moments treating all firm level variables as endogenous. One-step estimates reported. 
Note that the additional moments suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) were found to be rejected, 
so we do not use them. Column (1) repeats the baseline. Column (2) only uses instruments dates t-3 or 
earlier in order to allow for the possibility of first-order serial correlation (in the levels error). Column 
(3) treats R&D as strictly exogenous instead of endogenous. Column (4) drops the lagged values of 
firm-level variables (keeping the IV set the same). Column (5) includes sales t-2 and prior in the IV 
set.  
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Endnotes 
1 For surveys of this development see Keller (2004), Narula and Zanfei (2005) and Cantwell 
(2009). 
2 See Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Jaffe et al. (1993) on local restrictions of spillovers. 
Geographic boundaries to knowledge spillovers are also considered in Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(1999), Branstetter (2001), Keller (2002) and Almeida and Kogut (1999). 
3 For evidence on technology sourcing through FDI see Smarzynska (2004). For evidence on 
importance of outward FDI as indicator of technology sourcing see van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001). Naturally, knowledge flows may be bi-directional (Singh, 
2007). 
4 Turnover is deflated by two digit industry prices, material costs is deflated by the GDP 
deflator, capital stock is deflated by the producer price index for capital equipment, and R&D 
is deflated by a weighted average of the wage development in manufacturing (50%), the GDP 
deflator (40%) and the producer price index for capital equipment (10%): 
5 If there is no tangible stock in the first year we use the investment flow and scale it up based 
on the assumed steady state growth (5%) and depreciation rate (15%). If there is no 
investment flow in subsequent years to the initial year we use the tangible capital stock. 
6 For the interaction terms we use the patent portfolio of the whole group if the sample 
company is a subsidiary. This implies that we cover the knowledge that can be accessed from 
within the group. Looking only at the patent portfolio of the subsidiary would miss important 
parts of the access to knowledge. 
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7 The MIP data also provides information on cooperation with research institutions in the 
USA. We do not include this cooperation category because the number of companies with 
such a type of cooperation is too limited (there are only 8 firms).  
8 Note that in the regressions we use the share of inventors based in Germany or in the USA 
and not a dummy whether the company has at least one inventor based in Germany or in the 
USA. The same applies to the variable for coapplications. 
9 We also tested whether German companies benefit from basing inventors in Japan. We 
obtain a positive, but insignificant coefficient on the interaction term. The insignificance can 
be due to fewer observations with inventors in Japan or to lower gains from technology 
sourcing. Our sample has not enough observations for research cooperations with Japanese 
partners to allow for meaningful results. 
10 The increase in the US R&D stock of 21.4 percent is multiplied by 0.690, which is the 
coefficient on the variable “%Inventors in US * ln(US industry R&D)”. The calculation is 
based on the specification shown in Table 4, column 3. 
11 Following Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) we test for weak instruments by regressing the 
first difference of the endogenous variables on the t-2 lagged levels of the instruments, i.e. we 
calculated the first-stage for the instruments with Anderson-Hsiao style instruments. For all of 
the 11 first stages of our main specification we could confirm the joint significance of the 
instruments at least at the 1% level. 
12 When using GMM for the specification of Table 5, column 6 instead of a fixed-effects 
approach, we obtain qualitatively similar results for placing inventors in the US and for 
cooperating with US-based partners. For jointly filing patents with US co-applicants we find 
insignificant coefficients. 
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